Appeals to save democracy, and warnings that democracy is in grave danger, are increasingly common and widespread. Recent books with titles like How Democracy Ends and How Democracies Die reflect this existential anxiety.

In the abstract, ‘defending democracy’ is something most naturally support. But the assumptions behind such appeals are not always obvious. Political actors mean different things when they speak about ‘democracy’, and they differ over what is required to ‘defend’ it.

A one-sided view of democratic threats

Here, the EU’s much-publicised European Democracy Shield (EDS) offers a timely example of what elite democracy-defence discourse looks like in practice. The initiative, proposed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during the 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections, launched in November 2025. The EP has also created a special sub-committee bearing the same name.

Taking a closer look at the EDS, we see how it foregrounds particular democratic threats, and renders others invisible. The Commission has substituted substantive measures to strengthen democracy with geopolitical goals.

The European Democracy Shield is focused predominantly on external threats, such as 'Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference'

Indeed, what immediately stands out, as others note, is that the EDS is focused predominantly on external threats. In particular, it focuses on the threat posed by what it calls Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). This FIMI seemingly emanates chiefly from Russia.

Blurring the lines between democracy and geopolitics

Exploration of the official joint communication launching the EDS reveals that the term ‘FIMI’ appears 43 times. In comparison, the word ‘corruption’ appears just twice – both times in footnotes. Foreign interference is undoubtedly taking place, and damaging democratic discourse. Yet the Commission continues to emphasise cyber and hybrid threats, and conflates 'defending democracy' with resisting threats from geopolitical rivals. This emphasis raises significant questions, and highlights worrying blind spots. 

Clearly, actors with questionable democratic credentials also exist within the EU. In fact, civil society initiative Citizens Take Over Europe claims 'the most dangerous threat to democracy in Europe arguably comes from within'. The focus on Russia, which the official joint communication mentions 11 times, also overlooks the elephant in the room: the USA. Despite the current US administration's open willingness to intervene in European elections, the same document makes no mention of the country.

The dark side of defending democracy

Moreover, when defending democracy becomes intertwined with geopolitical threats, democracy becomes securitised, if not militarised. Or, in the words of the EDS, 'Defence spending could also be regarded as a means to support democratic resilience' through investing in cybersecurity and developing systems to defend against hybrid threats.

Yet moving the debate into such terrain enables the implementation of more intrusive measures under the guise of defending democracy. We see this in the EU’s sanction regime that targets individuals.

Few would disagree with the sanctioning of war criminals. Yet consider the sanctions on EU residents accused of spreading disinformation or propaganda about the conflicts in Ukraine or Gaza, which curtail fundamental civil liberties in the name of safeguarding democracy and tackling FIMI. This exposes a troubling tension between discourse and practice.

By using words such as 'shielding', the European Commission suggests walling off European democracy. Its language has parallels with the contemporary discourse of far-right parties

Likewise, we can glean much from the language the Commission uses. 'Shielding', for example, suggests walling off European democracy and guarding what we have from dangerous and external others. This has parallels with the civilisationalism that defines the contemporary discourse of far-right parties and many mainstream EU leaders.

Consider, for instance, ex-EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell's infamous comments that 'Europe is a garden', while 'Most of the rest of the world is a jungle, and the jungle could invade the garden'. Indeed, EU political elites routinely deploy the language of defending democracy to legitimise highly questionable actions.

For example, to pre-empt criticism following Israel’s violent assault on Gaza, von der Leyen invoked Israel’s claim to supposed democratic legitimacy. On 13 October 2023, she asserted, 'I know that how Israel responds will show that it is a democracy', even as many judged Israel’s response massively disproportionate. Indeed, it would become genocidal.

A better way to defend and strengthen democracy

We also need to ask what does not appear as a threat. Scholars argue that it is not just autocrats, but the concentration of economic power and lack of equal opportunities, which are endangering democracy. The feeling that modern democracies perpetuate rather than curtail inequalities is fuelling alienation among youth in disadvantaged communities. And, as Luca Verzichelli noted when launching this series, there is an urgent need to respond to declining public confidence in democratic governance and electoral politics.

Despite this, neither the word ‘inequality’ nor the phrase ‘popular sovereignty’ appear in the EDS launch document. It is also telling that it doesn't discuss how to defend EU democracy through empowering the European Parliament, the only directly elected EU institution.

By focusing on fighting foreign interference, the EDS is not engaging with other threats to democracy such as inequality or disillusionment

By equating 'defence of democracy' with 'fighting foreign interference', the EDS is not engaging with other threats to democracy, whether these are growing levels of inequality, disillusionment or the demise of responsive and representative political institutions. There is undoubtedly a shared sense of urgency about the need to defend democracy, and such appeals clearly resonate with many people on an emotional level. The EU would be well advised not to gamble with such positive feelings.

Foreign adversaries can be disruptive, but unless there is a focus on internal causes of disillusionment, such as growing inequality or the EU’s own democratic deficit, 'defending democracy' risks being interpreted as nothing more than 'defending the status quo'. For the EDS to succeed, and for the EU to meaningfully defend democracy, it is vital we address these more substantive democratic demands.

🎈 No.10 in a Loop series on Representative Disconnect

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