<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Valentina Cassar, Author at The Loop</title>
	<atom:link href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/author/v_cassar/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link></link>
	<description>ECPR&#039;s Political Science Blog</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 20 May 2025 08:16:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-GB</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	

 
	<item>
		<title>☢️ Saving arms control in a changing world order</title>
		<link>https://theloop.ecpr.eu/arms-control-in-a-changing-world-order/</link>
					<comments>https://theloop.ecpr.eu/arms-control-in-a-changing-world-order/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Valentina Cassar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 May 2025 08:19:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[☢️]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[All Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Featured]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New START Treaty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Politics Paradox]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear threat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TPNW]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://theloop.ecpr.eu/?p=21787</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Valentina Cassar examines the motivations for US-Russian diplomacy and arms control in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. What role do these countries' nuclear postures play in sustaining their international primacy? China, certainly, will play a key part, while the outcomes will influence all states in the broader nuclear order</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/arms-control-in-a-changing-world-order/">☢️ Saving arms control in a changing world order</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Valentina Cassar</strong> examines the motivations for US-Russian diplomacy and arms control in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. What role do these countries' nuclear postures play in sustaining their international primacy? China, certainly, will play a key part, while the outcomes will influence all states in the broader nuclear order</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Foreign policy statements are coming thick and fast out of the White House. As other governments scramble to keep up, the impression is that we are living through a transformational era.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-could-this-be-a-re-start-for-us-russian-relations">Could this be a re-START for US-Russian relations?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The foreign policy approach of Trump administration 2.0 stands in stark contrast with that of its predecessor. Trump’s rhetoric and approach to Russia, his relationship with President Putin, and his willingness to negotiate over Ukraine are all markedly different from Biden's.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691165868/the-limits-of-partnership">US-Russia relations</a> have always been tumultuous. Since the Cold War ended, they have cycled between tension and cooperation. Yet the decline precipitated by Russia’s war against Ukraine is unprecedented. The conflict has brought nuclear deterrence – and uncertainties surrounding extended deterrence – back to the forefront of European security politics.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">All this comes at a time when the future of arms control is unclear. Back in 2010, <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/new-start-glance">the US and Russia signed the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)</a> committing them to a reduction of arms, and a programme of monitoring and verification.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The first Trump administration was reluctant to commit to the Treaty’s extension, calling for China's inclusion in future arms control agreements. In 2021, the Biden administration eventually extended the Treaty for five years. Russia and the US agreed to bilateral strategic dialogue to explore a pathway for arms control. Diplomatic efforts, however, were suspended in 2023.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-geopolitics-of-arms-control">The geopolitics of arms control</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The New START Treaty expires in February 2026. Revival of Russia-US dialogue on broad security issues, and specifically on the renewal of the Treaty, is thus crucial before that point. There are <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CFA1896-1.html">various prospects</a> for a resuscitated arms control process and its outcomes. These may include maintenance of the status quo; or deteriorating relations and dialogue, and an increase in nuclear capabilities. More optimistically, they may result in a new agreement, and improved geopolitical stability.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ongoing tensions between Russia and Ukraine make renewal of an arms control framework, and the reassurance of strategic stability, extremely important. Yet arms control also holds value in the context of broader geopolitical changes.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Many observers now regard China as the only US competitor with the intent and capacity to reshape the international order</p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The US has long recognised Russia as a state with which it holds strategic parity, yet it also <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf">acknowledges that it faces systemic challenges from China</a>. Indeed, it is China which now poses the principal economic and political threat to the US. China's military modernisation and investment in nuclear capabilities is a cause of increasing concern. Many regard it as the only US competitor with the intent and capacity to reshape the international order.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Russia’s strategic outlook is underpinned by its nuclear capabilities. Despite its weaker political, economic and conventional military standing, nuclear weapons allow Russia to maintain a parity-of-sorts with the US.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-china-s-nuclear-growth">China’s nuclear growth</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In comparison with the <a href="https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-01/united-states-nuclear-weapons-2025/#post-heading">US</a> and <a href="https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-03/russian-nuclear-weapons-2024/#post-heading">Russia</a>, China's nuclear capability remains relatively small. Beijing has thus dismissed the need for restraint by arms control agreements because of the disparity in size of its nuclear arsenal. However, while China maintained only 178 warheads in 2011, <a href="https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/#post-heading">its arsenal had grown to an estimated 500 by 2024</a>. The <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF">US Department of Defence estimates</a> that China may exceed the 1,000 mark by 2030.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The US and Russia find themselves in a post-bipolar world in which they must contend with an increasingly assertive China</p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For the US and Russia, ongoing geopolitical shifts are challenging their international status, and threatening their primacy – whether real or perceived. Maintaining strategic stability also reaffirms their desired status. Both countries find themselves in a post-bipolar and post-American world, in which they must contend with a rising and increasingly assertive China. Bilateral strategic stability and trilateral strategic dialogue would therefore help them adjust to shifting geopolitical realities. It would also help them maintain their primacy within a redefined distribution of international order and influence.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-where-does-this-leave-the-rest">Where does this leave the rest?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Europe is seriously mulling over the possibility that the formerly rock-solid transatlantic alliance may no longer hold steady. The EU is discussing the need to '<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_673">rearm Europe</a>'. And the extended deterrence of the US nuclear umbrella, so long a cornerstone of NATO, has now also fallen into question.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The transatlantic alliance, so long a cornerstone of NATO, is no longer a given, and the EU is discussing the need to 'rearm Europe'</p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consequently, <a href="https://www.martenscentre.eu/publication/why-europe-needs-a-nuclear-deterrent-a-critical-appraisal/">academics</a> and politicians have raised the possibility of a distinct European deterrent. This could take the form of an extended <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/05/french-president-emmanuel-macron-says-russia-is-a-threat-to-france-and-to-europe">French</a> or British nuclear deterrent that guarantees the defence of European allies. Such a posture would also become more significant in an evolving strategic balance of power that may well necessitate wider arms control frameworks beyond the trilateral.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Developments like this may also give rise to greater concerns over nuclear proliferation within the broader international community, among 'rogue states' and others that have traditionally benefitted from extended deterrence. This has led <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/nuclear-age-proliferation-trump-nato-gideon-rose">Gideon Rose</a> to speculate whether Trump’s approach may usher in a new nuclear age of proliferation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In his <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/nuclear-politics-paradox-peace-progress-peril/">foundational piece for this series</a>, Mahmoud Javadi points out the paradox of nuclear politics. He shows the <a href="https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/publications/spread-nuclear-weapons-debate-renewed-second-edition">stark contrast</a> between the strategic stability that nuclear weapons may provide against the vulnerability and insecurity that may result from proliferation and mismanagement.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-haves-and-have-nots">Haves and have-nots</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The coming nuclear age need not be determined only by the nuclear haves. Impasses and frustrations within the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty regime, together with increasing concerns surrounding the humanitarian consequences of nuclear use, have led to the <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/?s=tpnw">Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)</a>. The TPNW is an increasingly valuable tool that gives agency to the nuclear have-nots – and a stronger voice to their concerns over strategic stability during a fractured nuclear age.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">☢️ <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/tag/nuclear-politics-paradox/">No.6 in a series on the Nuclear Politics Paradox</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/arms-control-in-a-changing-world-order/">☢️ Saving arms control in a changing world order</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://theloop.ecpr.eu/arms-control-in-a-changing-world-order/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
