Between geopolitics and proceduralism 

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine jolted enlargement from dormancy back to centre stage. In June 2022, the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, followed by Georgia in December 2023. Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the list of Western Balkan candidates, while Albania and North Macedonia finally began accession talks. 

This sudden momentum reflects a post-invasion narrative of enlargement as a geopolitical necessity. As Veronica Anghel argued in this series' foundational post, enlargement is a vital crisis response tool, enhancing the EU’s capacity to ‘adapt, survive, and thrive’ in a challenging environment.  

But will this surge of political will change the substance of enlargement? My research into EU discourse suggests not. I examined two sources:

• Speeches by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen from 2019–2024
• European Parliament party group manifestos before the 2019 and 2024 EP elections

Commission President von der Leyen’s speeches provide a snapshot of attitudes towards enlargement at the highest level. Von der Leyen comes closest to articulating a strategic vision on behalf of the EU as a supranational entity. European Parliament party group manifestos offer insight into how enlargement is viewed across Europe’s ideological and partisan divides. While the parliament is not traditionally regarded as a foreign policy actor, it does have a range of tools at its disposal, including a veto power that can wield influence at earlier stages of the enlargement process.

Enlargement is being discussed far more frequently and in warmer terms, but its framing remains overwhelmingly procedural

The findings of this discourse analysis are clear. EU actors are discussing enlargement far more frequently and in warmer terms, but its framing remains overwhelmingly procedural: accession as a step-by-step, conditional, merit-based process without shortcuts. 

The Commission’s rhetoric 

Von der Leyen’s engagement with enlargement has risen dramatically. Of 52 speeches that mention enlargement between late 2019 and 2024, 45 came after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, these references are overwhelmingly pro-enlargement. Von der Leyen makes frequent appeals to the ‘Europeanness’ of the candidate states, often framing them as members of the ‘European family’. She mixes her normative rhetoric with declarations of the geopolitical urgency of expansion. 

Her State of the Union addresses illustrate the shift. Enlargement was almost absent in 2020 and 2021, then gained prominence in 2022 and 2023. The 2022 address reassures the ‘people of the Western Balkans, of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’ that they are a part of the European family and that their ‘future is in our Union’. The 2023 address includes an entire subsection dedicated to enlargement, with a thematic focus on ‘completing’ the union. Yet even here, she balanced her rhetoric of belonging and urgency with reminders that accession must remain merit-based. 

The European Parliament, too, has shifted. Before 2019, only one of six party group manifestos even mentioned enlargement. By 2024, all six did. But the tone was cautious. While all party groups recognise the geopolitical dimension of enlargement, none contemplate fast-tracking the process. And while parliament’s centrists are generally positively disposed towards the EU’s further expansion, the manifestos of The Left group and the rightist Europe of Conservatives and Reformists are far more reticent. 

Plus ça change 

The rhetoric is strikingly familiar. Arguments that enlargement is both a geopolitical and normative imperative were common during the 2004 'big bang' and in debates over the Western Balkans. What's new is Ukraine’s inclusion in this rhetoric.

The vast majority of von der Leyen's enlargement speeches, and every party manifesto, stress that progress depends on each country’s performance in meeting EU accession criteria in full

Proceduralism continues to dominate. Nearly four out of five of von der Leyen’s enlargement speeches, as well as every party manifesto, stress the same formula: progress depends on each country’s performance in meeting EU accession criteria in full. 

Even rhetorically, the peak of post-invasion enlargement advocacy may have passed. In early September, von der Leyen gave her 2025 State of the Union address, the first of her second mandate. Enlargement was barely mentioned. At the same time, internal roadblocks are becoming more sharply defined, with Hungary openly threatening to veto Ukraine’s accession path. 

Reaching the turning point, but failing to turn

The shock of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine offered an opportunity to revive and radically reconceptualise enlargement as a geopolitical project. That moment appears to have passed. Post-invasion enlargement policy has charted new territory, but risk aversion and deep internal divisions threaten those gains. Geopolitical urgency has gained Ukraine admission to the EU membership waiting room. Proceduralism, long the hallmark of accession, looks set to keep it there. 

From discourse to action 

If enlargement remains framed only as a step-by-step process, the EU risks missing the very geopolitical opportunity that Russia’s war has created. Conditionality must remain central, but it should be linked more clearly to a strategic vision that ties reforms in candidate states to Europe’s collective security and resilience. Leaders also need to sustain rhetorical momentum. Allowing enlargement to fade from flagship speeches, as seen in von der Leyen’s 2025 State of the Union, weakens credibility and gives veto players like Hungary greater leverage.

If the EU continues to frame enlargement only as a step-by-step process, it risks missing the very geopolitical opportunity that Russia’s war has created

At the same time, the EU should adapt its tools to make conditionality more effective. Incremental rewards, such as earlier access to markets, participation in EU institutions, or deeper security cooperation, can prevent candidate fatigue while reforms advance. Safeguards against single-member obstruction are also essential, with qualified majority voting on enlargement decisions a debate the EU can no longer avoid. Ultimately, enlargement must be communicated not just as a technical process, but as a shared investment in European stability that benefits both new members and the EU as a whole.

No.30 in a Loop series on 🧭 EU enlargement dilemmas

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