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	<title>Noel Overby, Author at The Loop</title>
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		<title>Moldova versus Russian sharp power</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Noel Overby]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Jan 2025 09:12:46 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Winter is coming to Chișinău. On 1 January, Moscow cut off all gas exports to the former Soviet state of Moldova. John Chin and Noel Overby put this Russian energy embargo in the context of ongoing Moldovan resistance to a protracted Russian sharp power campaign</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/moldova-versus-russian-sharp-power/">Moldova versus Russian sharp power</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p class="has-medium-font-size">Winter is coming to Chișinău. On 1 January, Moscow cut off all gas exports to the former Soviet state of Moldova. <strong>John Chin</strong> and <strong>Noel Overby</strong> put this Russian energy embargo in the context of ongoing Moldovan resistance to a protracted Russian sharp power campaign</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-a-cold-winter">A cold winter</h2>



<p>Moldovans are bracing for a '<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldovan-president-warns-harsh-winter-inauguration-speech-2024-12-24/">harsh winter</a>' and power cuts in 2025. On 1 January, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/gazprom-says-it-will-stop-gas-exports-moldova-january-1-2024-12-28/">Russia cut off all gas exports to Moldova</a> piped via Ukraine and the breakaway region of Transnistria. Though Gazprom attributed the suspension to a debt dispute, Moldova’s prime minister Dorin Recean accused Moscow of using '<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-to-halt-gas-deliveries-to-moldova-from-january-1/a-71177330">energy as a political weapon</a>' in an attempt to '<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/05/world/europe/russia-gas-moldova-transnistria.html">destabilise Moldova</a>'.</p>



<p>The people of Chișinău were expecting the gas cutoff. Previously totally dependent on Moscow for natural gas, Moldova has been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-to-halt-gas-deliveries-to-moldova-from-january-1/a-71177330">diversifying energy sources</a> since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At her second inauguration on December 24, President Maia Sandu, who won a close election in November, promised that '<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldovan-president-warns-harsh-winter-inauguration-speech-2024-12-24/">light will prevail</a>' over Russian blackmail. To prepare, Moldova declared a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/moldova-declares-state-emergency-risk-russian-gas-cutoff-looms-2024-12-12/">60-day state of emergency</a> on 12 December. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/05/world/europe/russia-gas-moldova-transnistria.html">Electricity prices have doubled</a> in Moldova since then. </p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>Moldova is a democratic David living in the shadow of Russia's Goliath</p>
</blockquote>



<p>Moldova is a democratic David living in the shadow of Russia's Goliath. Like <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-legacy-of-romanias-1989-revolution/">Romania</a> and <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/georgias-second-rose-revolution/">Georgia</a>, Moldova is a frontline state in Russia’s near-abroad. It is a key target of a protracted Russian '<a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-is-sharp-power/">sharp power</a>' campaign, and of Western counter-efforts at integration.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-moldova-s-hard-won-democracy">Moldova’s hard-won democracy</h2>



<p>For the first decade of post-Soviet independence, Moldova’s fledgling democracy faced <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/43904/chapter/370128185">challenging conditions</a>. Obstacles included a weak civil society, <a href="https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Moldova">ethno-linguistic tensions</a> between a Russophone east and Moldovan-speaking west, a hostile <a href="https://hir.harvard.edu/transnistria-russias-next-battlefront/">Russia backing Transnistria</a>, <a href="https://wiiw.ac.at/moldova-dependent-on-aid-from-both-east-and-west-dlp-5461.pdf">aid dependence</a> and low development levels (<a href="https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2023">Moldova is Europe’s poorest country</a>), no prior democratic experience, and no prospect of entry into the European Union. Yet a weak state and vulnerability to Western pressure resulted in '<a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/pluralism-by-default-in-moldova/">pluralism by default</a>'.</p>



<p>After winning the 2001 elections, Moldova’s communist party (PCRM) led by Vladmir Voronin returned to power. Though they increased control over state media and courts, PCRM ultimately <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/authoritarian-state-building-and-the-sources-of-regime-competitiveness-in-the-fourth-wave-the-cases-of-belarus-moldova-russia-and-ukraine/BB1F9164F84B0C2376FCDCDA6913E896">failed to consolidate</a> a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/competitive-authoritarianism/20A51BE2EBAB59B8AAEFD91B8FA3C9D6">competitive authoritarian regime</a>. In 2002, pro-Romanian nationalists and students protested <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/1098431.html">the 'Russification' of language policy</a>. The PCRM yielded on language policy but kept office and won re-election in 2005.</p>



<p>The communists were finally ousted in 2009. After PCRM claimed 60 of 101 seats in the April 2009 parliamentary elections, fraud allegations triggered Moldova’s '<a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/moldovas-twitter-revolution/">Twitter revolution</a>', which was aided (if <a href="https://demokratizatsiya.pub/archives/21_4_11851622R6563866.pdf">secondarily</a>) by social media mobilisation. Some protesters <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/07/moldova-protests-chisinau">raised EU, Moldovan, and Romanian flags</a> outside parliament. Despite repression and lack of Western support, communists in parliament lacked a vote needed to elect a president. An <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/30/moldova-votes-communists-out">opposition coalition won new elections in July 2009</a>, and the Alliance for European Integration took power until, in 2013, a 'Pro European Coalition' replaced it.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>Despite corruption and oligarchic control of politics in the mid-2010s, Moldova experienced a 'democratic U-turn' after 2018</p>
</blockquote>



<p>Moldova has experienced two waves of democratisation since 2009, per V-Dem data (see the graph below). Despite '<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2023.2199452">widespread corruption and oligarchic control of politics</a>' causing democratic backsliding in the mid-2010s, there was a 'democratic U-turn' after 2018. In 2016, Moldova <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/43904/chapter/370128185">returned to semi-presidentialism</a>. In 2020 and 2024, Maia Sandu of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won close presidential elections.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-democracy-and-neopatrimonialism-levels-in-moldova-since-1992">Democracy and neopatrimonialism levels in Moldova since 1992</h4>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="683" src="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure1_359_Moldova_polyarchyneopattrends-1024x683.png" alt="" class="wp-image-20605" srcset="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure1_359_Moldova_polyarchyneopattrends-1024x683.png 1024w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure1_359_Moldova_polyarchyneopattrends-300x200.png 300w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure1_359_Moldova_polyarchyneopattrends-768x512.png 768w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure1_359_Moldova_polyarchyneopattrends-1536x1024.png 1536w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure1_359_Moldova_polyarchyneopattrends-2048x1365.png 2048w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure1_359_Moldova_polyarchyneopattrends.png 3900w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Source: <a href="https://v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/">V-Dem 2024</a>, v. 14</figcaption></figure>



<p>Yet Moldova’s <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/moldova/nations-transit/2024">democratic consolidation is incomplete</a>, despite efforts to implement reforms needed to open EU accession negotiations. <a href="https://www.iri.org/resources/national-poll-of-moldova-may-june-2024/">Moldovans lack trust in government institutions</a> and <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2024/04/08/anniversary-of-twitter-revolution-still-divides-moldova/">remain divided over the Twitter revolution’s legacy</a>. Sandu hailed it, while pro-Russian ex-president Igor Dodon has decried it for turning Moldova into a 'colony'.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-resisting-sharp-power-in-moldova">Resisting sharp power in Moldova</h2>



<p>Moldova is pulled in multiple directions. Neighbours Romania and Ukraine have the most influence capacity in the country, as do European powers <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/moldau-node/moldovarepublicof-229530">Germany</a> and <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/moldova/france-and-moldova-65046/">France</a>. Yet Russia has retained significant, if reduced, influence capacity in the country since 2014, per <a href="https://korbel.du.edu/fbic">FBIC data</a>. <a href="https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/moldova/">US influence capacity</a> in Moldova peaked two decades ago; <a href="https://english.news.cn/africa/20240608/647c967a918e42f384ed979332b7bda4/c.html">China’s</a> has gradually increased from low levels as trade has increased:</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-formal-bilateral-influence-capacity-in-moldova-1992-2023">Formal bilateral influence capacity in Moldova, 1992–2023</h4>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="683" src="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure2_359_Moldova_fig_fbictrends_main-1024x683.png" alt="" class="wp-image-20607" srcset="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure2_359_Moldova_fig_fbictrends_main-1024x683.png 1024w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure2_359_Moldova_fig_fbictrends_main-300x200.png 300w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure2_359_Moldova_fig_fbictrends_main-768x512.png 768w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure2_359_Moldova_fig_fbictrends_main-1536x1024.png 1536w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure2_359_Moldova_fig_fbictrends_main-2048x1365.png 2048w, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/figure2_359_Moldova_fig_fbictrends_main.png 3900w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Source: <a href="https://korbel.du.edu/fbic">FBIC dataset</a>, Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures</figcaption></figure>



<p>A significant portion of Moldova’s population shares cultural ties with Russia, and Russian influence in Moldova has its roots, in part, in <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/diw/diwwpp/dp921.html">ethno-linguistic affinity</a>. Russia also gives financial and political support to separatist Transnistria, including <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/more-than-a-frozen-conflict-russian-foreign-policy-toward-moldova-2/">maintaining troops in the region</a> and (until last week) providing free energy that could be sold to the rest of Moldova. Russia’s strategic goals include undermining <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/leaked-document-exposes-kremlins-10-year-plan-to-undermine-moldova/">Moldovan support for NATO and the EU</a>. As Moldova integrates west, Russia has responded with <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/10/russias-information-war-in-moldova/">disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks</a>, and election interference. In early 2023, Ukrainian intelligence <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/13/moldova-president-russia-coup-ukraine-war/">uncovered</a> a coup plot in Moldova <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldovan-president-says-russias-wagner-head-plotted-coup-against-her-ft-2023-10-06/">masterminded by the Wagner Group</a>. </p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>Russia’s strategic goals include undermining Moldovan support for NATO and the EU</p>
</blockquote>



<p>After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moldova’s PAS government <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/moldova_en">applied for EU membership</a> and has resisted Russian sharp power. In March 2024, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-signs-defence-pact-with-france-amid-russia-fears-2024-03-07/">France and Moldova signed a defence pact</a> amid fears of Russian aggression. President Sandu then scheduled a referendum on EU accession in October 2024, to coincide with presidential elections. As <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/13/russia-trying-to-meddle-in-moldova-polls-say-uk-us-and-canada">evidence mounted of a Russian plot to interfere</a>, Moldova responded by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-blocks-access-more-than-20-russian-media-websites-2023-10-24/">blocking access to over 20 Russian websites</a> and Meta <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2024/10/taking-action-against-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-in-moldova/">dismantled a network of fake news accounts</a> targeting Russian-speaking Moldovans.</p>



<p>The West has helped Moldova counter Russian sharp power through assistance <a href="https://warsawinstitute.org/moldova-is-becoming-independent-of-russian-gas-flows/">diversifying energy resources</a>, providing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/4/eu-to-significantly-increase-moldova-military-aid">non-lethal aid</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/10/19/moldova-election-protection-biden-russia-00184429">supporting counter-intelligence operations</a>, and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-nordic-ministers-elections-support/33159404.html">expressions of diplomatic support</a>. For example, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-moldova-czechia-nato-blinken-085dde8dc3ab04e1f6a11ae60cee9d36">visited Chișinău in May</a>, and the US committed $135 million in aid. Then in June, the <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12475">now-defunded</a> State Department <a href="https://www.state.gov/online-press-briefing-with-special-envoy-and-coordinator-of-the-global-engagement-center-james-p-rubin/">Global Engagement Center helped uncover a Russian disinformation campaign</a> in Moldova, including <a href="https://www.state.gov/alerting-the-world-to-rts-global-covert-activities/"><em>Russia Today</em>’s covert support to pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor</a>. Shor, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-is-ilan-shor-fugitive-tycoon-centre-moldovas-meddling-allegations-2024-10-21/">one of Moldova's most popular politicians</a>, was accused of <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/struggling-democracies-or-how-think-about-russias-interventions">recruiting people to vote for minor candidates against EU integration</a>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-a-european-spring">A European spring</h2>



<p>In the landmark October 2024 referendum, a slight majority (50.4%) of Moldovan voters <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/moldova-votes-yes-join-european-union/">backed inclusion of EU membership in Moldova’s constitution</a>. A <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2024/11/07/joint-statement-in-support-of-moldova">joint statement of support</a> for 'Moldova’s success in thwarting Russian destabilisation efforts' and commitment to taking 'its rightful place within a free and democratic Europe' was signed on 8 November by the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, the European Council, and the European Commission.</p>



<p>Moldova, which <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/is-eu-enlargement-to-ukraine-and-moldova-credible/">does not yet meet EU membership criteria</a>, has targeted joining the EU by 2030. EU membership appears a <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/why-eu-enlargement-is-a-strategic-necessity/">strategic necessity</a> for both Moldova and the EU.</p>



<p>Whatever happens, <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/389362/georgia-protests-eu-georgian-dream-russia">Moldova’s democracy and future in Europe</a> are at stake in the ongoing battle over whether a European spring follows Moldova’s harsh Russian winter.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/moldova-versus-russian-sharp-power/">Moldova versus Russian sharp power</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
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