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	<title>Magnús Árni Skjöld Magnússon, Author at The Loop</title>
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	<title>Magnús Árni Skjöld Magnússon, Author at The Loop</title>
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		<title>🧭 Why the EU cannot give up on enlargement to richer states</title>
		<link>https://theloop.ecpr.eu/why-the-eu-cannot-give-up-on-enlargement-to-richer-states/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Magnús Árni Skjöld Magnússon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 09:13:32 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Iceland’s rejection of renewed accession talks shows why wealthy European democracies stay outside the Union. Magnús Árni Skjöld Magnússon argues that the EU built its entry route for countries that need convergence, and should open a second door: full membership with a few permanent, narrowly defined exemptions</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/why-the-eu-cannot-give-up-on-enlargement-to-richer-states/">🧭 Why the EU cannot give up on enlargement to richer states</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p class="has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph">Iceland’s rejection of renewed accession talks shows why wealthy European democracies stay outside the Union. <strong><strong>Magnús Árni Skjöld Magnússon</strong></strong> argues that the EU built its entry route for countries that need convergence, and should open a second door: full membership with a few permanent, narrowly defined exemptions</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On 29 August 2026, Icelanders <a href="https://www.visir.is/p/thjodaratkvaedagreidslaumesbvidraedur">voted 52.8% to 47.2% against</a> resuming EU accession talks. It is the latest sign of a pattern the Union has not faced squarely: richer, stable European democracies keep declining to join. The reason is not hostility to Europe. It is sovereignty.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The result leaves Iceland tied to the EU through the European Economic Area, following many of its rules without a seat where they are made. That democratic cost has not outweighed fear of losing control over fisheries. The EU should offer a second route: full membership, with a few permanent exemptions written into the accession treaty.</p>



<h2 id="h-four-countries-one-pattern" class="wp-block-heading">Four countries, one pattern</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Norway rejected membership twice, in 1972 and 1994. In March 2026 its parliament <a href="https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2025-2026/refs-202526-03-03?m=12">voted 78 to 21</a> against even investigating EU membership. Britain left in 2020, at a cost its own budget watchdog puts at <a href="https://www.cer.eu/insights/gap-between-brexit-reset-rhetoric-and-reality">around 4% of long-run output</a>. Switzerland refused the European Economic Area in 1992. It walked away from an institutional framework agreement with Brussels in 2021. It has since <a href="https://www.admin.ch/en/newnsb/LtHL_GZEJHpOXgbaEJQut">signed a new package of treaties</a>, which still needs approval by the Swiss parliament and possibly voters.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The histories differ, but sovereignty runs through all four. Fisheries lie at the centre of the resistance in Iceland and Norway. In Britain they were a small part of the economy but a powerful symbol of lost control. The fish are not really the point. The point is the right to decide, nationally, who fishes your waters and on what terms.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Close ties also reduce the pressure to choose. The EEA already gives Iceland and Norway much of the single market, so membership would add influence but also new obligations. An argument about aggregate gains has little force when voters expect concentrated losses in a sector they see as central to national autonomy.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The European Economic Area already gives Iceland and Norway much of the single market, so membership would add influence but also new obligations</p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Brussels did signal flexibility before Iceland’s vote. Fisheries Commissioner Costas Kadis saw ‘<a href="https://www.nordiskpost.com/2026/04/23/eu-offers-iceland-flexibility-on-fisherie-before-referendum/">space for flexibility</a>’. EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos is quoted as saying the bloc seeks ‘<a href="https://www.visir.is/g/20262918197d/esb-vill-skapandi-lausnir-fyrir-islenskan-sjavarutveg">creative solutions</a>’. Neither promised that any exemption would be permanent, and <a href="https://lydraedisveislan.is/en/esbkosningar2026/sjavarutvegur/">opponents of accession pressed that point</a> again and again.</p>



<h2 id="h-an-entry-route-built-for-a-different-problem" class="wp-block-heading">An entry route built for a different problem</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The countries that want in today are largely those with the most to gain from convergence: the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova. For them, membership brings structural funds, a rule-of-law anchor and, for Ukraine and Moldova, a measure of security NATO cannot yet offer. That logic is sound and should continue. It says little to Iceland, Norway, Switzerland or Britain, which have high incomes and working institutions.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The countries that want in today are largely those with the most to gain from convergence: the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova</p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The current route includes the common agricultural and fisheries policies and the pull towards ‘ever closer union’. For states that need none of the support, it mostly costs what they value most. The direction of travel is not encouraging. On 6 October 2026 the Commission <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/06/new-eu-members-face-15-year-probation-period-after-joining-the-bloc">proposed a 15-year period</a> after accession in which new members that seriously breach the rule of law could lose funding and, in the gravest cases, their votes. It targets the next Viktor Orbán, not Iceland or Norway. But it does nothing for the concerns that keep richer democracies out.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Depth was not originally designed as an entry test. In 1950, Robert Schuman proposed placing French and German coal and steel under a joint authority, to make war between the two countries not just unthinkable but materially impossible. Deeper integration solved that one rivalry. Over decades it hardened into a requirement for everyone.</p>



<h2 id="h-why-europe-needs-them" class="wp-block-heading">Why Europe needs them<a></a></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Europe cannot afford to leave these states on the touchline. Russia’s war in Ukraine and doubts about America’s staying power make security a shared project. Britain is one of Europe’s two nuclear powers. Norway supplies much of the Union’s gas. Iceland sits on the North Atlantic routes on which NATO depends. Switzerland brings finance and research.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Much cooperation already happens outside membership. Membership would add durable commitments and give citizens of closely integrated countries a voice in decisions that already affect them, while making their governments answerable for shared choices.</p>



<h2 id="h-a-second-door" class="wp-block-heading">A second door</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I <a href="https://skemman.is/handle/1946/20042">suggested around the turn of the millennium</a> that flexibility would strengthen the Union’s legitimacy, not weaken it. Citizens accept deeper integration when they ask for it after seeing the benefits. They resent it when distant elites push it on them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Membership of this kind needs a safety valve around sovereignty, and the Union is already multi-speed. Denmark keeps opt-outs on the euro and parts of justice policy. Ireland stays outside Schengen. That should become the rule, not the exception.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Each state would be able to have a protected core: a short list of matters that stays national for good. The accession treaty would say so, instead of leaving transitional periods that end in full alignment. Votes would come with membership, as for any member. Common rules and reciprocal obligations would apply everywhere else, because existing members must see the balance as fair.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Icelandic voters did not say no to Europe. They said no to the only offer on the table</p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The message to these states should then reverse. Today it says: here is what we built for ourselves, adopt it as it stands. It should say: come in. Take up the four freedoms, the citizenship, the EU flag, the Ode to Joy and the seat at the table. You have no veto over how far the willing integrate without you, and you may join that deeper layer later. If you never do, you are still Europe. Citizens of Reykjavik or Zurich are no less European than those of Lisbon or Warsaw.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nobody can know whether a second offer would have won in Iceland. The first one lost. Icelandic voters did not say no to Europe. They said no to the only offer on the table. A Union confident in its own case would put a second one there.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/tag/eu-enlargement-dilemmas/">No.44 in a Loop series on 🧭 EU enlargement dilemmas</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/why-the-eu-cannot-give-up-on-enlargement-to-richer-states/">🧭 Why the EU cannot give up on enlargement to richer states</a> appeared first on <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu">The Loop</a>.</p>
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